AI Concludes that you typically have a BETTER chance of winning by kicking than running another play by a small total of
0.38% (but depends on the accuracy of the kicker as well) but results in the times you don't convert being reduced by about
16% (i.e. don't convert 2.38% of the time you run then kick, don't convert 2% of the time you kick early):
Conclusion: "In college football overtime, if the opponent has already been stopped and any field goal wins, I would strongly favor kicking on third down from the 2-yard line."
Mathematical Analysis:
With an above-average college kicker, I estimate that kicking immediately has roughly a 97–98% chance of winning, compared with approximately 96–98% for running another play and then kicking if necessary.
The important distinction is that another offensive play introduces risks that don't exist if you kick immediately: offensive holding, false starts, a bad exchange, a fumble, or a tackle for loss. A penalty doesn't necessarily lose the game, but it can turn a 19-yard field goal into a 29-yard or longer attempt.
These are modeled estimates rather than measured probabilities for this exact situation. Let's incorporate those risks explicitly.
A
Assume the following for an above-average FBS kicker and a reasonably effective short-yardage offense.
| Assumption | Probability |
|---|
| Make a centered 19-yard FG | 98% |
| Score a TD on the run | 50% |
| Turnover on the run | 1% |
| Penalty or significant loss that worsens the kick | 5% |
| Other unsuccessful run, leaving an easy FG | 44% |
| Make FG after penalty/significant loss | 90% |
The 98% kicking estimate is plausible for a strong college kicker at this distance, although not guaranteed. For perspective, one college-football analysis found 95.1% success on field goals attempted inside the 5-yard line across its study sample.
The other assumptions are illustrative, not verified league-wide rates for this exact play.
Probability of scoring the winning points on this possession
Kick on third down
98.00%
Run, then kick
97.62%
Running calculation
\[50\%+(44\%\times98\%)+(5\%\times90\%)\]
\[=97.62\%\]
The kick has a 0.38-percentage-point advantage, or about four additional wins per 1,000 comparable possessions in this simplified model.
How
A 10-yard holding penalty can move the kick from approximately 19 yards to 29 yards. A 5-yard false start moves it to 24 yards. Both remain manageable, but they reduce the advantage of being at the 2-yard line.
One important nuance: a false start or other pre-snap penalty can also happen when lining up to kick. However, on third down the team generally still has the opportunity to attempt the kick after enforcement. That makes the third-down kick especially attractive.
My
Under the assumptions above, kicking on third down is mathematically preferable, but only marginally.
I would choose the kick for three reasons:
- An above-average kicker should be highly reliable from 19 yards.
- Running introduces additional turnover and field-position risks.
- Kicking on third down preserves fourth down if a mishandled snap can be recovered without losing possession.
The result is sensitive to the assumptions. If the offense has a 60% chance of scoring a touchdown and very little turnover risk, running could become the better option. Conversely, a team with a 40% touchdown probability should be even more inclined to kick.
Bottom line: For a typical FBS team with an above-average kicker, already having stopped the opponent in overtime, I would send out the field goal unit on third down. The available evidence doesn't establish a definitive universal answer, but a realistic model that accounts for penalties and turnovers gives the kick a slight advantage.
. Two chances vs one. I am dumbfounded
